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Covering RISKS with Interlocked Sensing Elements, SIL ensured and other HIPPS

(in lingua inglese)

Allo scopo di ridurre il RISCHIO, bisogna escludere guasti durante l’intervento umano sugli strumenti oltre a dover garantire la correttezza e l’accuratezza dei dati misurati. La presentazione è tenuta da Precision Fluid Controls, in collaborazione con la società olandese ASTAVA, leader mondiale nella realizzazione di: sistemi interlocking, cassette di protezione, valvole.
- Todays goal: Safety & Availability
- RISKS? What RISKS?
- Operational Safety versus Functional Safety
- Pipe to Pipe
- Instrument loops
- Measurement integrity
- Practical solutions for Safeguarding
- IEC61508/IEC61511 and SIL
- Practical instrument loops, HIPPS
- Stop the mathematics!
- Practical solutions
- Total integrity
- Lifecycle Guarantee

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Atti di convegni o presentazioni contenenti case history
mcT Petrolchimico Milano novembre 2016 workshop

Pubblicato
da Benedetta Rampini
mcT Petrolchimico Milano 2016Segui aziendaSegui




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Estratto del testo
Milano, 24 novembre 2016 Gli atti dei convegni e più di 8.000 contenuti su www.verticale.net Covering RISKS with Interlocked Sensing Elements, SIL ensured and other HIPPS Una breve introduzione' Dal 1998 distribuiamo su tutto il territorio
nazionale strumenti per la misura e controllo dei
fluidi, ma non solo'
Soluzioni Service ' Assistenza sul campo ' Start up impianto ' Noleggio strumentazione ' Calibrazione e taratura strumenti Alcuni dei nostri marchi: Pressostati, termostati e livellostati
Trasmettitori di pressione, temperatura e livello
Indicatori di livello magnetici e valvole.
Misuratori e regolatori di portata massici termici
Misuratori e regolatori di portata a effetto Coriolis
Raccorderia e valvole a doppio anello Riduttori di pressione e valvole Ma oggi siamo qui per raccontarvi di: Società olandese, distribuita in esclusiva da Precision Fluid Controls sul territorio italiano, leader mondiale nella realizzazione di sistemi interlocking, cassette di protezione strumenti, valvole e manifold. 7 Workshop Covering RISKS with interlocked sensing elements, SIL ensured 8 Workshop: Covering RISKS Workshop title ''Covering RISKS with Interlocked Sensing Elements, SIL ensured.' Abstract
When reducing RISK, failures must be excluded during the human operation of instruments.
And the integrity of the measured data must be guaranteed. This technical workshop
explains how to ensure the safety level (like SIL) during human operation of
pressure/temperature instruments, without disturbing the process. Participants
End-users, EPC, users, engineers, designers, project-managers,
sales-engineers and other people with a Safety & Availability responsibility. Speaker
Sjef Hamelynck
Functional Safety Engineer & Safety Product Manager
sjef@astava.com 9 Agenda Introduction Operational Safety 1. The playing field 6. Instrument loops 2. Todays goal: Safety & Availability 7. Measurement integrity 3. RISKS' What RISKS' 8. Practical solutions for Safeguarding 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety
5. Pipe to Pipe Functional Safety Wrap up 9. IEC61508/IEC61511 and SIL 15. Are we safe now' 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS
11. Stop the mathematics!
12. Practical solutions
13. Total integrity
14. Lifecycle Guarantee Workshop: Covering RISKS 10 Introduction Introduction 11 Introduction Astava ' Our partner Precision Fluid Controls
' 60 years!
' Engineering
' Manufacturing
' Assembling
' Instrumentation Solutions 12 Introduction 1. The playing field: process industry sector ' Oil
' Gas
' Petrochemical
' Chemical
' Pharmaceuticals
' Power 13 Introduction 1. The playing field: Pressure & Temperature ' Pressure
' Differential Pressure
' Flow by DP
' Level by DP
' Temperature
' Transmitters
' Gauges
' Switches
' Threaded
' Diaphragm seal
' Remote diaphragm seal P DP FL L T 14 US Introduction 2. Todays goal: Safety & Availability ' People
' Planet
' Profit
' Corporate Social Responsibility
' Reputation (end-user, EPC, industry, country) ' Freedom of unaccaptable RISK
' Money ' RISK REDUCTION to an ACCEPTABLE LEVEL! 15 Introduction 3. RISKS' What RISKS' ' RISK = Frequency x Consequence ' Human Failures
' Equipment Failures ' Less experienced people (field, design)
' Standard specifications
' Contracting
' Higher stress
' Harsh conditions
' Higher pressure
' Toxic medium RISK = Frequency x Consequence Source: TNO 16 Introduction 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety ' Layers of protection Operational Safety Functional Safety Source: Yokogawa 17 Introduction 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety Operational Safety Functional Safety Functions: Functions: - Safety layers with instrumentation - Last layer of defence with instrumentation - Protection against un-necessary process loss - Protection against un-necessary production loss - RISK Reduction - RISK Reduction - Normal process controls
- Higher integrity of measurement data
- Less Non Conformities, paperwork, audits
- Less and easier procedures
- Lower cost of ownership, less maintenance
- Integer statistics
- Less frustrations 18 Introduction 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety Operational Safety Functional Safety Impact when failure: Costly Impact when failure: Huge Costs for Safety: Costs for Safety: - Initial investment is higher then standard instrument manifolds - Initial investment is part of total plant investments
- Costs of ownership under control - Cost of ownership is known during Lifecycle - Costs after lifetime are lower - Costs after Lifecycle are low Costs for NON-Safety: yes Costs for NON-Safety: huge RISK = Frequency x Consequence: RISK = Frequency x Consequence: - Frequency must be lower - Frequency = must be low - Consequence = lower - Consequence = high 19 Introduction 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety Operational Safety Functional Safety When used: When used: - Outcome of HAZOP - Outcome of HAZOP - Continuesly - On demand - As a result of practical (safety) issues Standards: Standards: - Customer specific - IEC61508 / IEC61511 Safety Level: Safety Level: - Customer specific - SIL 1, SIL 2, SIL 3 or SIL 4 - Not always expressed in a measurable value - Determined by following the standards - A single component can reduce the RISK - RISK reduction not enough' Then redesign the process/plant - Human operation can be secured with procedures - Only the complete loop can reduce the RISK
- Human operation cannot be secured with procedures 20 Introduction 4. Operational Safety versus Functional Safety Operational Safety Functional Safety Solutions: Solutions: - Standard instrument loops BUT safer components - HIPPS for PT, HIDPPS for DPT
- HILPS (DPT)
- HITPS (Temperature)
- SIS/SIF Applications: Applications: - All process industry applications - Over PRESSURE, DIFFERENTIAL protection
- Over LEVEL, FLOW protection
- Over TEMPERATURE protection Design: Design: - Common pratice - Strictly according to the standards - Can be part of existing safety layer - Independent and seperate safety layer - More complex - Easier - Safe on paper means safe in the field' 21 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe ' Instrument loop design from Pipe to Pipe
' Pipe = pipe, tank, heater, pump, compressor, motor, valve, etc
' Instrument loop design from sensing to computing to actuating ' Basic design
' Detailed design 22 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Basic design) 23 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Basic design) ' How important is this measurement'
' What happens if this measurement is not available, is not integer or fails'
' How do you select materials and components'
' Do you include lifetime expectations of this three components'
' Do you include ''quality' and guarantee expectations of this three components'
' Are you aware of failure rates and proven in use data of the selected components'
' Can anything go wrong during human operation of the components' ' Can you answer these questions with 100% confidence' If not' what are the RISKS' RISK = Frequency x Consequence 24 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Basic design) ' Any RISKS left' 25 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Detailed design) ' Manifold, Pressure Transmitter, PLC/DCS, Actuator, Components 26 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Detailed design) ' How important is this measurement'
' What happens if this measurement is not available, is not integer or fails'
' How do you select materials and components'
' Do you include lifetime expectations of this components'
' Do you include ''quality' and guarantee expectations of this components'
' Are you aware of failure rates and proven in use data of the selected components'
' Can anything go wrong during human operation of the components' ' Can you answer these questions with 100% confidence' If not' what are the RISKS' RISK = Frequency x Consequence 27 Introduction 5. Pipe to Pipe (Detailed design) ' Any RISKS left' 28 Operational Safety Operational Safety 29 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' What can be a RISK with a traditional Manifold with Pressure Transmitter'' 30 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' What can be a RISK with a traditional Manifold with Pressure Transmitter'' 31 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' What can be a RISK with a traditional Manifold with Pressure Transmitter'' 32 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' What can be a RISK with a traditional Manifold with Pressure Transmitter'' OPERATING FAILURES ! WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION ! 33 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' What can be a RISK with a traditional Manifold with Pressure Transmitter'' OPERATING FAILURES ! WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION ! PRODUCTION LOSS ! POLUTION EMISSION MAINTENANCE costs 34 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' OPERATING FAILURES !
' All valves can be operated, opened and closed, in random order
' The test-plug can be loosened
' The valve position, open or closed, cannot be seen
' So what can happen' Bleed can be opened before closing the Block' 35 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' This can happen due to OPERATING FAILURES ! Pressure drop, production impact''' Pollution Emission High pressure exhaust, dirt-bullets Toxic exhaust Valves open or closed' Forgotten''' Test-plug bullet 36 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' This can happen due to OPERATING FAILURES ! Pressure drop, production stop''' Pollution Emission High pressure exhaust, dirt-bullets Toxic exhaust Valves open or closed' Forgotten'' Test-plug bullet PRODUCTION LOSS ! POLUTION EMISSION MAINTENANCE costs 37 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' This can happen due to OPERATING FAILURES ! Pressure drop, production stop''' Pollution Emission High pressure exhaust, dirt-bullets Toxic exhaust Valves open or closed' Forgotten'' Test-plug bullet RISK = Frequency x Consequence 38 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION !
' Components are selected out of the standard database
' Flowschematics BLOCK-BLEED or BLOCK-BLEED-BLOCK
' Material selection
' Bore size
' Guarantee, failure rates and proven in use data
' Standards like NACE and PED
' Maintenance costs, repair costs, cost of ownership
' Etc. ' How about your selection criterea'
' Can you quarantee that your components are operational safe' ' How safe is a SIL 2 transmitter' 39 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' This can happen due to WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION ! Valves stuck open or closed Leakage Blockage Components blow out Loosening components 40 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' This can happen due to WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION ! Valves stuck open or closed Leakage Blockage Components blow out Loosening components PRODUCTION LOSS ! POLUTION EMISSION MAINTENANCE costs 41 Operational Safety 6. Instrument loops ' This can happen due to WRONG COMPONENT SELECTION ! Valves stuck open or closed Leakage Blockage Components blow out Loosening components RISK = Frequency x Consequence 42 Operational Safety 7. Measurement Integrity ' Normal situation
' The 80 bar is integer 43 Operational Safety 7. Measurement Integrity ' During operation of the manifold
' Block valve closed
' The 80 bar is NOT INTEGER
' RISK' ' 44 Operational Safety 7. Measurement Integrity ' Redundancy for measurement availability
' The process is running
' Normal situation
' The 80 bar is integer 45 Operational Safety 7. Measurement Integrity ' Redundancy for measurement availability
' The process is running
' During operation of the manifold
' Two block valves can be closed HUMAN FAILURE ! ' The 80 bar is NOT INTEGER
' RISK' ' 46 Sizes up to 2' Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding ' Safety Manifolds
' Mechanical Interlocked manifolds for Operational Safety
' Valve position indication for Measurement Integrity
' Operational safe, operating failures are excluded, human failures are avoided
' The manifold''s valves can only be opened or closed in the right, safe and determined sequence
' The valve position is clear
' Proven in use since 40 years (number of operational failures: 0)
' For personal safety and process availability during operations and maintenance
' Forced mechanical procedure (sliding key principle)
' Valve position indication for system-controls
' Redundancy for continues measurement availability
' Avoid to ''Forget' bringing back the pressure measurement into the system-controls ' PED for Safeguarding Assembly cat IV
' Fire safe API 607
' Sizes up to 2'
' Needle valves, ball valves PED CAT IV API 607 Needle valves, Ball valves 47 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding ' Valve position indication 48 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding ' Valve position indication
' Data ''integer' 49 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 50 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 51 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 52 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 53 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 54 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 55 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 56 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 57 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding 58 Operational Safety 8. Practical Solutions for Safeguarding ' Sampling 59 Operational Safety Operational Safety PRODUCTION LOSS ! POLUTION EMISSION MAINTENANCE costs Low cost of ownership No loss RISK reduced RISK reduced No polution 60 Functional Safety Functional Safety 61 Functional Safety 9. IEC61508/IEC61511 and SIL ' IEC61508 / IEC61511 - PFD - SIL - Redundancy - Logic Solver - SIF/SIS - HFT - HAZOP - FSM - Voting - Sensing Elements - Actuating Elements - Risk - Risk Reduction - Lifecycle -
Common Cause '' Safety '' Availability ' Safety Competence Training (on request)
' Training in line with the competence expectations of the IEC61511/IEC61508 Functional Safety Standards. Focus on pressure instrumentation solutions and HIMB used in Safety
Instrumented Systems and HIPPS. Safety Competence Training On request 62 Functional Safety 9. IEC61508/IEC61511 and SIL ' Functional Safety Management ' ''Structural Elimination of Failures'' Functional Safety = Functional Safety Management 63 Functional Safety 9. IEC61508/IEC61511 and SIL ' Functional Safety Management ' ''Structural Elimination of Failures'' Functional Safety = Functional Safety Management Last Layer of Defence ! 64 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops ' Basic SIF design (Safety Instrumented Function)
' Like HIPPS, HIDPPS, HILPS, HITPS, PPS and other SIS, SIF''s
' PIPE TO PIPE
' SIL 1, SIL 2, SIL 3, SIL 4 65 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS ' Basic HIPPS design (High Integrity Pressure Protection System) 66 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS ' Basic HIPPS design (High Integrity Pressure Protection System) 67 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS ' HIPPS design ' PIPE TO PIPE 68 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS ' Detailed HIPPS design 69 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS ' Detailed HIPPS design Last Layer of Defence ! 70 Functional Safety 10. Practical instrument loops, HIPPS ' Detailed HIPPS design 71 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! ' Testing/calibrating Pressure Transmitters
' Any RISK for human failures' 72 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! ' Testing/calibrating Pressure Transmitters
' RISK for human failures!
' SIL cannot be guaranteed!
' No integer Functional Safety Management All Transmitters can be isolated: ' No SIL
' Trip 73 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! ' SIL cannot be guaranteed!
' No integer Functional Safety Management 74 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! ' SIL cannot be guaranteed!
' No integer Functional Safety Management 75 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! ' SIL 2 (or SIL 1) required Solution: 2e Transmitter Human Failure 76 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! ' SIL 2 (or SIL 1) required Solution: Interlocking! Human Failure 77 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! ' SIL 3 required Solution: 3e Transmitter 78 Functional Safety 11. Stop the mathematics! ' SIL 3 required Solution: Interlocking! Human Failure 79 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Functional Safety Management ' PIPE TO PIPE ' Structural Eliminaton of Failures' SIL ensured ! 80 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions Functional Safety Management ' PIPE TO PIPE ' Structural Eliminaton of Failures' SIL ensured ! Last Layer of Defence ! 81 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' Interlocking Manifold, SIL certified
' HIMB (High Integrity Manifold Block)
' One transmitter can be isolated at a time Official Safety Function of Interlocking Manifold =
"Operating Steps and availability" for maintenance
of pressure sensors whose failure could have an
effect on the safety of people and/or environment. Ensure the SIL ! SIL Certificate 82 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' Seperate process tapping SIL Certificate 83 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' Seperate process tapping SIL Certificate 84 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' Common process tapping SIL Certificate 85 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' Common process tapping SIL Certificate 86 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' Common process tapping 87 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' Seperate process tapping 88 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' Diaphragm seal transmitters
' Flushing 89 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' Diaphragm seal transmitters
' Flushing 90 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' HILPS 91 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' HIDPPS 92 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions ' HITPS 93 Functional Safety 12. Practical solutions, others ' Procedures / Workpermits (high cost of ownership, audit costs, FSM', assesment') ' Other locking system (NO PED CAT IV, new to design, No SIL certificate) 94 Functional Safety 13. Total integrity ' Proximity Switches for 2oo3 ' 1oo2
' Protection enclosures
' High/Low temperature alarms
' Heating ' Needle valve
' Ball valves ' Bores up to 2' ! 95 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee ' Astava offers Lifecycle Guarantee
' Quality = 40 years without failure
' Cost of ownership Lifecycle Guarantee 96 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee ' Safety & Availability during the Lifecycle
' PIPE TO PIPE Lifecycle Guarantee 97 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee ' Safety & Availability during the Lifecycle
' PIPE TO PIPE Lifecycle Guarantee Last Layer of Defence ! 98 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee ' Safety & Availability during the Lifecycle
' ''Alternatives' Lifecycle Guarantee 99 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee ' Safety & Availability during the Lifecycle
' ''Alternatives' Who will take this decision and responsibility' Lifecycle Guarantee 100 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee ' Costs during the Lifecycle
' PIPE TO PIPE Lifecycle Guarantee 101 Functional Safety 14. Lifecycle Guarantee ' Costs during the Lifecycle
' ''Alternatives' Lifecycle Guarantee 102 Wrap up Wrap up 103 Wrap up 15. Are we safe now' ' Is it dangerous beeing a human'
' Your questions please'
' Presentation available on request at sjef@astava.com ' Thank you very much!


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